On Firms' Preferences for Product Differentiation by Rajeev Tyagi
On Firms' Preferences for Product Differentiation 
Rajeev Tyagi
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
We examine firms' preferences for product differentiation when a firm has a demand−side
and/or a cost−side advantage over its competitor. We show that if the magnitude of these
advantages is small, then both firms prefer more differentiated products. However, if the
magnitude of demand−side (cost−side) advantage is larger, then only the advantaged
(disadvantaged) firm prefers more differentiated products.
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It is generally accepted in oligopoly theory that ﬁrms prefer to diﬀerentiate their products
since that helps them avoid harsh price competition. In an inﬂu e n t i a lp a p e r ,D ’ A s p r e m o n t
et al (1979) build on Hotelling (1929) to formally show that if two symmetric ﬁrms choose
values of a product characteristic before competing on prices, then they prefer to maximally
diﬀerentiate on that product characteristic. This famous principle of “maximal diﬀerentia-
tion” has since been shown to not hold in many circumstances, helping explain the presence
of undiﬀerentiated products in many markets. For example, De Palma et al (1985) show that
when ﬁrms have suﬃciently large uncertainty about consumer choice rules, then ﬁrms choose
to minimally diﬀerentiate on the product characteristic that is under their control; Irmen
and Thisse (1998) show that if ﬁrms compete on multiple product characteristics, then they
need to maximally diﬀerentiate on only one of those dimensions; and Bester (1998) shows
that if ﬁrms also compete on product quality that is not perfectly observable to consumers,
then ﬁrms maintain high prices to signal quality and hence the need to diﬀerentiate on the
observable horizontal product characteristic disappears.
One feature common to these models is that ﬁrms share their preferences for product
diﬀerentiation — either both prefer more product diﬀerentiation or both prefer less product
diﬀerentiation. The purpose of this paper is explore whether and when ﬁrms in a market may
not have the same preference for product diﬀerentiation. We build a model in which one ﬁrm
is stronger than the other one owing to a demand-side and/or a cost-side advantage. We show
that if the extent of this advantage is small, then, consistent with the principle of maximal
diﬀerentiation, both ﬁrms prefer more diﬀerentiated products. However, if the extent of
this advantage is large, then ﬁrms do not share their preferences for product diﬀerentiation.
Speciﬁcally, if a ﬁrm in a market has a large cost-side advantage over the other ﬁrm, then
only the disadvantaged ﬁrm prefers more diﬀerentiated products; on the other hand, if a
ﬁrm has a large demand-side advantage over the other one, then only the advantaged ﬁrm
p r e f e r sm o r ed i ﬀerentiated products.
Thus, we show that the magnitude and the source of competitive advantage of the
stronger ﬁrm in a market determines whether ﬁrms share their preference for product diﬀer-
entiation and which ﬁrm prefers less product diﬀerentiation.
2. The Model
Consider a market with two ﬁrms, S (strong ﬁrm) and W (weak ﬁrm). The strong ﬁrm
gets larger market share and proﬁt owing to its competitive advantage on (i) the demand
side, (ii) the cost side, or (iii) both the demand- and cost-sides. We explore ﬁrms’ preferences
for product diﬀerentiation under each of these three cases next.
12.1. Cost-Side Advantage
Let the marginal cost of production of the strong ﬁrm be cs and that of the weak ﬁrm
be cw >c s. For simplicity, we set cs =0and cw = d>0 so that d represents the extent of
cost asymmetry.





[1 − pi + β (p − pi)], i = {s,w}, (1)
where p =( ps + pw)/2 is the average market price and parameter β ∈ [0,∞] represents the
degree of product substitutability between the two products. In particular, β =0represents
the case where products are completely independent and β →∞represents the case where
products are completely substitutable. As shown in Shubik and Levitan (1980), this demand
function results from the following concave utility function of the representative consumer:
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where I is the numeraire good.
The proﬁt-maximization problems for the two ﬁrms are Maxps [psqs],a n dMaxpw [(pw − d)qw],
where the expressions for qs and qw are given in (1). The ﬁrst-order conditions for the strong
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From the ﬁrst-order conditions and the equilibrium prices in (2), we note that in the presence
of cost asymmetry, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s price is higher than the eﬃcient ﬁr m ’ s ;f u r t h e r ,t h i s
price diﬀerence is larger for larger cost asymmetry. Thus, as expected, the equilibrium
quantities in (3) show that the introduction of cost asymmetry leads to ineﬃcient ﬁrm losing
1This demand function is similar to the popular demand system proposed by Singh and Vives (1984).
2s a l e sa n dt h ee ﬃcient ﬁrm gaining sales; further this sales-shifting eﬀect is larger when cost
asymmetry is larger and/or products are less diﬀerentiated. In fact, when
d ≥ d(β)=
8+6 β
8+β (8 + β)
, (5)
then the ineﬃcient ﬁrm cannot sell anything proﬁtably and the eﬃcient ﬁrm becomes a
monopoly. Further, note that d(β) decreases in β,g o i n gf r o m1t o0a sβ goes from 0 to ∞,
and hence the sales-shifting eﬀect is stronger for less-diﬀerentiated products.2
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where b d(β)=
2β (4 + 3β)
2
(2 + β)[64+β {80 + 3β (12 + β)}]
.
Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. If ﬁrms are asymmetric on the cost-side, then (i) the weak ﬁrm always
prefers more diﬀerentiated products, but (ii) the strong ﬁrm prefers less diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts if the extent of its cost advantage is large.
Intuitively, decreased product diﬀerentiation hurts both ﬁrms by increasing the intensity
of competition, whether ﬁrms have the same or diﬀerent marginal costs. However, when
ﬁrms diﬀer in their marginal costs, then decreased product diﬀerentiation has the above-
described additional eﬀect of shifting sales from the high-cost ﬁrm to the low-cost ﬁrm, with
this eﬀect increasing in magnitude for larger cost asymmetries. As a result, while the higher-
cost ﬁrm always beneﬁts from increased product diﬀerentiation, the lower-cost ﬁrm prefers
less diﬀerentiated products when the extent of its cost advantage is large.
2.2. Demand-Side Advantage
We next consider the case where both ﬁrms have the same marginal cost of production,
which is set to zero, but the stronger ﬁrm has a demand-side advantage over the weak
ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, we use the following asymmetric demand function proposed by Shubik
and Levitan (1980):3
qi = wi [1 − pi + β (p − pi)], i = {s,w} (6)
2The condition in (5) can alternatively be rewritten as β ≥
h
3 − 4d +
p
9 − 8(2− d)d
i
/d, which de-
creases in d, going from ∞ to 0 as d goes from 0 to 1.
3All our qualitative results hold for other similar popular linear demand functions, such as qi = ai−pi+
β (pj − pi),w h e r eas >a w in the asymmetric demand case and as = aw in the symmetric demand case.
3where wi is the strength of ﬁrm i,a n dp =
P
wipi is the weighted average price in the market.
Weights wis introduce asymmetry in the demand structure, as inﬂuenced by price, and sum
to unity (
P
wi =1 )s ot h a ti fb o t hﬁrms were to charge the same price, then wi would be the
ﬁrm i’s market share.4 Note that the symmetric demand function in (1) is the special case
of (6) with ws = ww =0 .5. Here we let ws = λ and ww =1− λ, with parameter λ ∈ (0.5,1]
representing the extent of demand asymmetry. As before, parameter β ∈ [0,∞] represents
the degree of product substitutability between the two products. Finally, as shown in Shubik
and Levitan (1980), this demand function results from the following concave utility function
o ft h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ec o n s u m e r :















where I is the numeraire good.
The proﬁt-maximizing problems for the two ﬁrms are now Maxpi [πi = piqi], i = {s,w},
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From the ﬁrst-order conditions and the equilibrium prices in (7), we note that in the presence
of demand asymmetry, the stronger ﬁrm’s price is higher than the weaker ﬁrm’s; further,
this price diﬀerence is larger for larger demand asymmetry. Then, since the price diﬀerence
between the ﬁrms aﬀects their sales more when products are less diﬀerentiated, the weaker
ﬁrm can beneﬁt from reduced product diﬀerentiation when the demand asymmetry is large.5
4The reasons for the innate demand-side asymmetry, captured by weights wis, are exogenous to our
model and can be seen, for example, as long-run factors such as diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ ages, the eﬀectiveness
of their past advertising history, etc.
5Alternatively, using the Envelope theorem, we get dπ∗








∂qi/∂pj > 0 and ∂p∗
j/∂β < 0,d π ∗
i /dβ can be positive only when ∂qi/∂β > 0. Using the demand function in
( 6 )a n dt h ef a c tt h a tp∗
s >p ∗
w in the presence of demand asymmetry, we have ∂qs/∂β < 0 and ∂qw/∂β > 0.
Therefore, dπ∗
s/dβ < 0,a n ddπ∗
w/dβ can be positive.









S 0 for λ S b λ(β) where b λ(β) ∈ [0.667,1).
We state this result below, relegating the expression of b λ(β) to the Appendix.
Proposition 2. If ﬁrms are asymmetric on the demand-side, then (i) the strong ﬁrm always
prefers more diﬀerentiated products, but (ii) the weak ﬁrm prefers less diﬀerentiated products
if the other ﬁrm has a large demand advantage.
Intuitively, decreased product diﬀerentiation hurts both ﬁrms by increasing the intensity
of competition, whether ﬁrms have the same or diﬀerent strengths on the demand side.
However, when ﬁrms diﬀer in their demand strengths and hence charge diﬀerent prices,
then decreased product diﬀerentiation has the additional eﬀect of increasing the emphasis
on ﬁrms’ relative prices. Since the stronger ﬁrm charges a higher price, both these eﬀects
of decreased product diﬀerentiation hurt it and hence it always prefers more diﬀerentiated
products. The weaker ﬁrm, on the other, does beneﬁtf r o mm o r ee m p h a s i so nr e l a t i v ep r i c e s
since it charges the lower price in the market, and hence it prefers less diﬀerentiated products
when the other ﬁrm has a strong demand advantage.
2.3. Both Demand-Side and Cost-Side Advantages
We next conﬁrm that both the results identiﬁed in the last Sections carry over when the
stronger ﬁrm possesses both the demand-side and the cost-side advantages.
The objectives functions for the two ﬁrms are now Maxps [psqs],a n dMaxpw [(pw − d)qw],
where the expressions for qs and qw a r ea sg i v e ni n( 6 ) . T h eﬁrst-order conditions for the




, and pw =
1+λβps + d(1 + λβ)
2[1+λβ]
.




2+β [1 + λ + d(1 − λ)(1+βλ)]




2(1+d)+β [2 − λ +2 d{1+β (1 − λ)λ}]






λ[1 + β (1 − λ)][2 + β {1+λ + d(1 − λ)(1+βλ)}]





(1 − λ)(1+βλ)[2(1− d)+β {2 − λ − d(2 + βλ(1 − λ))}]





λ[1 + β (1 − λ)][2 + β {1+λ + d(1 − λ)(1+βλ)}]
2
[4 + β [4 + 3β (1 − λ)λ]]




(1 − λ)(1+βλ)[2(1− d)+β {2 − λ − d(2 + βλ(1 − λ))}]
2
[4 + β [4 + 3β (1 − λ)λ]]
2 . (14)
From (10)-(12), we need the following condition on the extent of cost asymmetry to ensure
that both ﬁrms can sell positive quantities at positive prices:
d<d1(β)=
2+β (2 − λ)
2+β [2 + βλ(1 − λ)]
. (15)









S 0 for d T b d2(β),w h e r eb d1(β) > b d2(β).
We state this result below, relegating the expressions for b d1(β) and b d2(β) to the Appendix.
Proposition 3. If the strong ﬁrm has both demand-side and cost-side advantage over the
weak ﬁrm, then (i) for small cost- and demand-asymmetries, both ﬁrms prefer more diﬀer-
entiated products; (ii) for large cost asymmetries, the stronger ﬁrm prefers less diﬀerentiated
products; and (iii) for large demand asymmetries, the weaker ﬁrm prefers less diﬀerentiated
products.
The intuition remains the same as that given for Propositions 1 and 2, and is not repeated
here. Figure 1 shows both ﬁrms’ preferences for product diﬀerentiation.
3. Conclusion
We have shown that the magnitude and source of competitive advantage possessed by
the stronger ﬁrm in a market determines whether ﬁrms share their preferences for product
diﬀerentiation, and which ﬁrm prefers less diﬀerentiated products. Thus, depending on these
two features of competitive advantage in a market, one can expect to see various product
diﬀerentiation strategies in use by ﬁrms.
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Figure 1: Firms’ Preferences for Product Diﬀerentiation.
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7Appendix
We give below some lengthy expressions that were omitted from the main text.
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+2 β
3 [68 + 3β (23 + 6β)].
Although there are some imaginary components above, the whole expression for b λ(β)
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2. In Section 2.3
b d1(β)=
β [−4+1 2 λ + β {−4+λ(4(5 − 3λ)+3 β (1 − λ2))}]
8+β [4(3 + λ)+β {4+λ{18 − 14λ +3 β (1 − λ)(3+λ(1 + β (1 − λ)))}}]
, and
b d2(β)=
β [4(−2+3 λ) − β {4+λ{4+3 β (2 − λ)(1− λ) − 12λ}}]
8+β [8(1 + λ)+β {4+λ{6 − 2λ +3 β (1 − λ)(2+βλ(1 − λ))}}]
.
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